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Judicial Review of Contract Interpretation
by Labor Arbitrators: Whose Brand of
Industrial Justice?
Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
Local Union No. 66'

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has prescribed the deference owed to an
arbitrator's interpretation of labor agreements. The Court's decisions have made
clear the narrow grounds upon which an arbitration award may be reversed. In
Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Int'l Bhd of Elec. Workers, Local Union No.
66, the employer claimed that the labor arbitrator had exceeded his authority by
misinterpreting the labor agreement. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had to
weigh the policy of deference to the arbitrator's interpretation against the need to
ensure that the arbitrator acted within the authority which the parties to the labor
agreement granted him.

I1. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1992, Houston Lighting and Power Company (HL&P) discharged Sam
Thomal, a member of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
Union No. 66 (Union), as part of a reduction in force.2 The Union filed a
grievance claiming that the discharge violated the seniority provision of the
collective bargaining agreement (Agreement) because HL&P retained employees
The Union's grievance was submitted to
with less seniority than Thornal
arbitration as required by the terms of the Agreement.4
The Union made two claims at the arbitration hearing. It first claimed that
HL&P's evaluation process was facially invalid under the Agreement because it

1.
2.
3.
4.

71 F.3d 179 (5th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 180-81.
Id. at 181.
Id.
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claimed that the
was arbitrary, unjust and unreasonable.' Alternatively, the Union
6
process was unfairly and unreasonably applied to Thornal.
On the first claim, the arbitrator found that the Union failed to show that the
process was facially invalid under the Agreement.7 On the second claim,
however, the arbitrator found for the Union, finding HL&P's application of the
evaluation process unreasonable as against Thornal.' The arbitrator reviewed and
re-assessed Thornal's qualifications9 and determined that Thornal had been
incorrectly rated by HL&P.' Because Thornal would not have been discharged
with the correct rating, the arbitrator ordered Thornal reinstated with backpay,
seniority and lost benefits."
HL&P appealed the arbitrator's order to the federal district court and moved
for summary judgment. 2 The district court denied HL&P's motion for summary
3
judgment and granted the Union's cross-motion for summary judgment.' As a
result, the district court upheld the arbitrator's order and entered judgment in favor
of the Union.' 4
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the issue of whether
exceededhis authority when he re-evaluatedThornal's qualifications
arbitrator
the
and re-calculated his rating. 5 The court decided that "[i]f the language of the
agreement is clear and unequivocal, an arbitrator is not free to change its
meaning."" Determining the individual employee qualifications, according to the
court, is the exclusive right of HL&P under the Agreement. 7 The court noted
that Article IV, Section 7 of the Agreement "subject[s]" this exclusive right to "an
employee's right to assert a grievance."'" According to the court, this phrase
permits an arbitrator to determine whether the evaluation process was consistent

5. Id. HL&P employees were evaluated through a merit-based system that evaluated them based
on ability, skill and qualifications. Id. Based on their supervisor's evaluations, employees were rated
as "above average," "average," or "marginal" within their job classification. Id. As part of the
reduction in force, HL&P first discharged the employees rated "marginal" in their job classification.
Id. Seniority was only used to break a tie when two employees were ranked equally in skill. Id. The
company discharged two employees, Thomal and Byers, from the heavy equipment operator
classification. Id. Seniority was not an issue since Thomal and Byers were the only employees in the
classification rated "marginal." Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. The court noted that the "arbitrator drew from his collective bargaining experience in the federal
public sector." Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 184.
17. Id
18. Id.
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with the Agreement, but not to make a "de novo determination" of an employee's
qualifications.' 9

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 (Act)20 addessed the issue of labor clontract
enforcement and granted federal courts jurisdiction to hear suits alleging collective
bargaining agreement (agreement)violations. 2 By 1960, the Supreme Court had
interpreted this jurisdiction to mean that federal courts had authority to enforce
agreements which provided for arbitration of labor contract disputes. Under this
interpretation, the courts could order the union and employer to submit to
arbitration.22 With this settled, the main question left for determination was
whether a court could order the enforcement of the labor arbitrator's award.23
The Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative.24 In United
Steelworkersof America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., following the district
court's order for arbitration, the arbitrator required the company to reinstate the
grievants and give them back pay.25 When the company refused, the district
court directed the company to comply. 26 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the award was unenforceable
because the agreement under which the grievance was brought had expired.27
The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the court of appeals and, in doing so, set
down firm standards for review of arbitration awards in the context of labor
disputes.28
The Supreme Court held that in accordancewith the federalpolicy of settling
labor disputes by arbitration, courts cannot review the merits of an arbitration
award when arbitration is required by an agreement. 29 The Court recognized that
because the arbitrator is to settle disputes at the factory level, he must have
knowledge of the customs and practices of a particular factory or industry. 3 3

19. Id.
20. See, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et. seq. (1996).

21. Mark Berger, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: Practices, Policies, and
Sanctions, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 245, 261-62 (1992).
22. Id. at 262.
23. Id.
24. United Steelworkers of American v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
25. Id. at 595.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 596.

28. Id. at 599.
29. Id. at 596.
30. Id The Court noted that the plant (a mill or factory) is like another world. Id. at 596 n.2
"[TIhe society . . . [of a plant] has of course a formal government of its own--the rules which
management and the union have laid down--but... it also differs from or parallels the world outside
in social classes, folklore, ritual, and traditions." Id (quoting Charles R. Walker, Life in the Automatic

Factory, 36 HARV. BUS. REV. 111, 117 (1958)).
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Furthermore, the arbitrator must use his informed judgment in order to interpret
and apply the agreement and, most importantly, to formulate remedies."
It is especially crucial that the courts do not review the merits of an
arbitration award when the arbitrator issues a written opinion. Recognizing that
an arbitrator is not obligated to issue a written opinion,32 the Court warned that
a lower court's refusal to enforce an award solely because an ambiguity in the
arbitrator's opinion reflects that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority
might encourage arbitrators to "play it safe" by not writing supporting opinions. 3
Such a result would be contrary to the policy of having an arbitrator issue opinions
to engender confidence in the integrity of the arbitration process and to help
clarify the underlying agreement. 4
The Court, however, did not give the arbitrator unlimited power. The
arbitrator cannot go outside the written agreement. 3 Instead, he must limit
himself to interpreting and applying the agreement because, as the Court stated,
"[the arbitrator] does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice."'
Though the arbitrator may look to other sources for guidance, the award must
"[draw] its essence" from the agreement. If it does not "[draw] its essence" from
the agreement, the court must refuse to enforce the award. 7
In United PaperworkersInternational Union v. Msco, Inc.,3" the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the role of the courts in labor agreement arbitration. In Misco,
the arbitrator ordered the company to reinstate an employee on the grounds that
the company had insufficient cause to fire the employee.3 9 Subsequently, the
district court and the court of appeals refused to enforce the reinstatement ordered
by the arbitrator on public policy grounds.4" Reversing this decision by the lower
courts, the Supreme Court cited the language in Steelworkersv. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp. which set forth the federal policy of settling labor disputes by
arbitrations and reminded courts not to review the merits of an arbitration
41
award.
The Supreme Court in Misco stated that reviewing courts cannot review
claims that the arbitrator erred in determining the facts or in interpreting the

31. Id. at 597.
32. Id. at 598.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. ld. at 597.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 484 U.S. 29 (1987),
39. Id. at 34. The arbitrator found that there was insufficient cause to find the employee had
possessed or used marijuana on company property where the employee was merely found in the
backseat of a car on the company parking lot with a lit marijuana cigarette in the frontseat ashtray.
Id.
40. Id. at 34-35.
41. Id. at 36 (citing Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)).
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agreement. 2 This statement is based on the Court's observation that the parties
in an agreement contract to have disputes settled by an arbitrator chosen by them
and to abide by the arbitrator's view of the facts and meaning of the agreement.43
Based on the Court's holding in Msco, even when a reviewing court disagrees
with an arbitrator's interpretation of a contract, it may not refuse to enforce the
arbitrator's award unless the arbitrator ignored the plain language of the
contract."

Despite these clear standards enunciated by the Supreme Court, there have
been times when the courts have examined the merits of an arbitrator's findings
of fact and interpretation of contracts.
In HkIC Management Corp. v. CarpentersDist. Council,45 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals examined an arbitrator's award ordering reinstatement and
backpay to the grievant. 4' The arbitrator had found that the company should
reinstate the grievantbecause a similarly situated employee was reinstated after the
same offense.47 In a short opinion, the court found that the arbitrator had
dispensed "his own brand of industrial justice."4 To support this finding, the
court noted that though the arbitrator found that the company did have just cause
to terminate the grievant, the arbitrator ordered the reinstatement of the grievant
because the arbitrator believed the company's behavior was improper.49
The Fifth Circuit's holding, however, was criticized for relying on the
arbitrator's written findings and not allowing for the possibility that the arbitrator
may have implicitly found that the employer had not shown sufficient cause for
discharge when compared to the other employee's similar actions.5" The court
seemed to require an express finding of lack of just cause. This requirement,
however, directly conflicts with Enterprise Wheel's admonition that reviewing
courts must not base a refusal to enforce an award on "[a] mere ambiguity in the
opinion accompanying an award."'"
The Fifth Circuit's decision was further criticized for its failure to recognize
that arbitrators generally do not allow disparate penalties against similarly situated
employees. 2 Moreover, many courts have recognized that when a labor
agreement does not specifically prevent arbitrators from examining the degree of

42. Id. at 38.
43. Id.at 37-38.
44. Id.at 38. "[Als long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and
acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not
suffice to overturn his decision." Id.
45. 750 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1985).
46. Id.at 1303.
47. Id.
48. Id at 1304 (quoting Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.).
49. Id
50. Charles B. Craver, Labor Arbitration as a Continuation ofthe Collective Bargaining Process,
66 CHL-KENT L Rzy. 571, 596 (1990).
51. Id.(quoting Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 598).
52. Id.
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punishment, a court should allow the arbitrator to consider not only whether there
was just cause for punishment, but also whether the degree of punishment fit the
infraction."
In Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial
Ass'n,"4 the arbitrator ordered the company to reinstate the pilot of the
Mississippi Queen after the company had terminated the pilot for a near
The company discharged the pilot pursuant to the collective
collision."
bargaining agreement language providing that "[njo Officer shall be discharged
except for proper cause such as, but not limited to, inefficiency, insubordination,
carelessness, or disregard of the rules of the Company."56 The arbitrator found
that although the pilot was guilty of gross carelessness, he was also the victim of
disparate treatment." This finding was based on three other serious mishaps in
which the responsible pilots suffered no disciplinary action.58 The district court
vacated the arbitration award on the grounds that the arbitrator was bound by the
agreement to find for the company if proper cause existed for discipline or
discharge.59 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
holding.60
The Fifth Circuit interpreted Supreme Court jurisprudence as "requiring
vacation of arbitral decisions that reinstate discharged employees when such
arbitral action is deemed to be an ultra vires act." 61 The Fifth Circuit relied on
an earlier Fifth Circuit decision, ContainerProducts,Inc. v. United Steelworkers
of America,62 in which the arbitrator reinstated a discharged employee to
"promote good labor relations." 63 The arbitrator's findings in ContainerProducts
were similar to those of Delta Queen because the arbitrator failed to make a
specific finding of "just cause" despite his finding that the employee was at fault
for refusing to work. 6" The court in ContainerProductsvacated the arbitration

53. Id. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 1442,
901 F.2d 1494, 1496-98 (9th Cir. 1990); Dixie Warehouse v. Teamsters Local 89, 898 F.2d 507, 510511 (6th Cir. 1990); Eberhard Foods, Inc. v. Handy, 868 F.2d 890, 892-93 (6th Cir. 1989); Florida
Power Corp. v. IBEW, 847 F.2d 680, 681-83 (1lth Cir. 1988); United States Postal Serv. v. National
Assoc. of Letter Carriers, 839 F.2d 146 (3rd Cir. 1988). Although the degree of punishment was not
at issue in the instant case, judicial history, especially in the Fifth Circuit, is instructive of the general
mindset towards labor contract interpretation in arbitration.
54. 889 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 (1990).
55. Id. at 600.
56. Id. at 601.
57. Id.at 601 n.6.
58. Id. at 601.
59. Id. The agreement read, "[tJhe right to discipline and discharge for proper cause are [sic]
likevise the sole responsibility oft1he Company." Id. The arbit-ator found gross .arelessness, but he
specifically avoided a finding of "proper cause." Id. at 604.
60. Id.at 604.
61. Id.at 602.
62. 873 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1989).
63. Delta Queen, 889 F.2d at 602 (citing ContainerProds., 873 F.2d at 820).
64. Id.
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award, finding that becausethe arbitrator actually made an "implicit finding ofjust
cause for the [employee's] dismissal," the arbitrator was not allowed by the
agreement to impose a different remedy than what the company imposed.65
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit in Delta Queen concluded that because the arbitrator
had implicitly found proper cause, the arbitrator should be prohibited from
ordering the employee's reinstatement.66
The Fifth Circuit in Delta Queen also stated that the rule in that circuit and
the emerging trend among the other circuits67 is "that arbitral action contrary to
express contractual provisions will not be respected."" According to the court,
the Eleventh Circuit in Bruno's,Inc. v. United Fund& Commercial Workers Int 7

Union vacated an arbitrator's award because the arbitrator's establishment of a
new operating procedure was contrary to the bargaining agreement.69 The court
in Bruno's held that the arbitrator "may not create a new rule to replace one he
strikes down as unreasonable."70 The Sixth Circuit examined circumstances
similar to those in Delta Queen and found that an arbitrator lacked authority to
reinstate an employee after finding that just cause existed for the employee's
discharge and finding that the employer had sole responsibility for discipline.7
As noted above, other courts have differed with Delta Queen in cases with
similar facts. The Eighth Circuit sided with the arbitrator's interpretation of an
agreement in Local 238, InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters v. Cargill,Inc.72

Despite the company's stated policy that any refusal of a random drug test would
result in termination, the arbitrator in Cargillreinstated a grievant who refused to
take the test." The district court found that the language of the agreement was
unambiguous and vacated the award.74 The court of appeals, however, found that
this same language was ambiguous because the provision in the collective
bargaining agreement stating that disputes be grieved to an arbitrator and stating
that the arbitrator had remedial discretion to review terminations for just cause was
inconsistent with the company's termination policy.75 While the drug policy
seemed to call for termination, it was only incorporated by reference into the

65. Id. at 602-03 (quoting ContainerProds., 873 F.2d at 820).
66. Id. at 604.
67. The court cited the decisions of the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits to demonstrate the emerging
trend. Id. at 603. These cases include Bruno's, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l
Union, 858 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1988) and International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 429 v. Toshiba
Am., Inc., 879 F.2d 208, 210-11 (6th Cir. 1989).
68. Delta Queen, 889 F.2d at 604.
69. Id. at 603 (citing Bruno's, 858 F.2d at 1529).
70. Id. (quoting Bruno's, 858 F.2d a 1532).
71. Id. at 603 n.8 (citing Magnavox Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 410 F.2d 388,
389 (6th Cir. 1969)).
72. 66 F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 1995).
73. Id. at 989.
74. Id.
75. Id at 990.
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collective bargaining agreement."

Because the agreement contained an

ambiguity, it was "clearly a matter for the arbitrator and was well within his
authority."7" The court found that it should be even more deferential in this case

since this was a question of remedy.7"

The Eight Circuit also found it "highly significant" that the parties asked the

arbitrator to determine if the grievant was discharged for just cause.79 When
both parties submit an issue to the arbitrator, the court stated that "we must look
both to their contract and to the submission of the issue to the arbitrator to

determine his authority.""0 The limits of an arbitrator's authority are defined in
part by the parties' own submission to the arbitrator.8" Therefore, since the
company in this case asked the arbitrator to determine if there was just cause, it
complain later when the arbitrator determined that there was no just
could not
2
cause.Y

IV. INSTANT DECISION

A. The Majority
In the instant case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals first noted that it would
employ a de novo standard of review when reviewing a grant of summary
judgment in a suit to vacate an arbitration award." In labor disputes, the court
noted that an arbitrator's "award cannot be set aside" as long as the arbitrator's
decision drew its essence from the agreement and the arbitrator was "not

fashioning his own brand of industrial justice."'

The court also noted, however,

76. Id.
77. Id. See also, Hamilton v. United States Postal Serv., 746 F.2d 1325, 1327 (8th Cir. 1984);
Kewanee Mach. Div., Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Local Union No. 21, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 593
F.2d 314, 317 (8th Cir. 1979).
78. Cargill, 66 F.3d at 990. "Though the arbitrator's decision must draw its essence from the
agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem.
This is especially true when it comes to formulating remedies."' Id.(quoting AMisco, 484 U.S. at 41).
79. Id. The court stated that "[wlhen two parties submit an issue to arbitration, it confers authority
upon the arbitrator to decide that issue." Id at 990-9 1. See, First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S.Ct
1920, 1923 (1995).
80. Cargill,66 F.3d at 991 (quoting John Morell & Co. v. Local Union 304A, 913 F.2d 544, 561
(8th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 500 U.S. 905 (1991)).
91. Id
82. Id
83. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 71 F.3d at 181. See also Michael G. Munsell, Case Note,
Scope of Review for Orders Confirming, Vacating, or Modiffing Arbitral Awards: An End to
DeferentialStandards, 1996 J. DIm. RESOL 213 (discussing the "normal" standard of review and the
Supreme Court's resolution of a conflict among the circuits regarding the "hybrid" standard of review).
84. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 71 F.3d at 182.
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that vacation of the judgment is appropriate where the arbitrator exceeds his
authority under the agreement.85
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the Agreement and found that the arbitrator went
beyond his authority when he re-evaluated Thornal's qualifications.8 6 According
to the court, the Agreement's language 87 limited an employee to two possible
claims.'a First, the employee could contend that the system and procedures used
by HL&P to evaluate the employee's ability, skill and qualifications were
inconsistent with the terms of the Agreement or were an improper application of
the Agreement.89 Second, the employee could contend that 1L&P discriminated
against him or her in the evaluation process because of race, color, religion, sex
or national origin.9" Because the Union did not raise a discrimination claim, the
arbitrator could only have ruled in favor of the Union for the former reason.9
The arbitrator found that the evaluation process was "within the scope of the
contractually allowed factors" and found that the Union did not show that the
process was facially invalid.9 2 Based on these findings, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that there were no grounds upon which the arbitrator could find for the
Union. 93

The court found that the "assert a grievance" phrase did not mean that HL&P
gave up its right to determine an employee's qualifications if the employee asserts
a grievance nor did it give the arbitrator the right to "make a de novo
determination of the employee's qualifications. "94 The court noted that there was
nothing in the Agreement which would allow the interpretation of "a grievance"
"to include... a claim that an employee [was] unfairly or incorrectly evaluated
for lay off. '95 Finally, the court found that the arbitrator acted outside the
language of the Agreement when he relied on "his experience and practice in other
arbitrations in the 'federal public sector'."" Based on these findings, the Fifth

85. Id.
86. Id. at 183.
87. The court relied on Article IV, Section 7, which states that "[tihe Company shall determine
ability, skill and qualifications, subject to an employee's right to assert a grievance under Article II,"
and Article II, Section 1, which states, "[a] grievance, as that term is used in this contract means any
dispute involving the proper application or interpretation of this Agreement, or a claim that an
employee has been unreasonably and unjustly discriminated against." Id. at 182, 184.
88. Id. at 184.
89. Id.
90. Id
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. "Federal public sector" arbitration is governed by federal statute and includes different
rules for grievance arbitration." See Justin C. Smith & Craig Paul Wood, Tile VII of the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978: A "Perfect"Order?, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 855, 856-62 (1980).
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Circuit concluded that the arbitrator's re-evaluation of the employee went beyond
the scope of his authority and beyond the parties' contractual agreement. 97

B. The Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Lay relied on three main arguments to rebut the
majority. First, Judge Lay argued that the trial judge properly relied on the parties
to define the issues in light of the crowded court dockets that judges are now
facing. 98 HL&P's own counsel admitted that the arbitrator had the right to
determine whiether Thornal was less qualified when HL&P stated in its brief that
the issue "'was whether or not the Company had violated the collectivebargaining
Also, HL&P's
agreement by laying off Thornal out of line of seniority.' "'
00
counsel previously submitted the issue in the same way to the arbitrator.'
Based on these earlier statements by HL&P's counsel, the dissent contends that the
majority incorrectly "undermines the authority of the district court and creates
may rely upon counsel's statement of
uncertainty as to whether district courts
"
issues in order to shorten proceedings. 1
In Judge Lay's second argument, he emphasized that the terms of the
Agreement allowed the arbitrator to re-evaluate Thornal.'" The contract stated
that "[t]he Company shall determine ability, skill and qualifications, subject to an
employee's right to assert a grievance under Article II [of the Agreement].' 0 3
Article II defined a grievance as "any dispute involving the proper application or
"' Article II of the Agreement also
interpretation of this Agreement. . . ,,
provided that "[tihe sole function of the arbitrator shall be to determine whether
the Company or Union is correct with reference to the proper application and
interpretation of this Agreement."'0 5 Based on the Agreement and the parties'
submission of the issues to the arbitrator, the dissent concluded that the arbitrator
was "expressly authorized" to examine whether HL&P correctly decided that
Thomal was less qualified. 106 The dissent also stated that "[w]hile a court may
of authority, it must resolve
review whether an arbitrator has exceeded his scope
07
all doubts in favor of the arbitrator's authority.'

97. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 71 F.3d at 184.
98. Id. at 184-85.
99. Id. (citing the district judge's opinion in Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. The Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, Local No. 66, No. 94-908, at 2 (8.D.Tex. Aug. 25, 1994)).
100. Id.at 185.
101. Id.
102. Id at 185-86.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id at 185.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 186.
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Finally, the dissent differs with the majority on the issue of the arbitrator's
authority to determine the remedy. 10 8 The majority contended that if the
arbitrator found the evaluation process to be inconsistent with the Agreement, he
could not re-evaluate Thornal himself, but had to allow HL&P to make the reevaluation.'0 9 The dissent points out that "[ilt is well settled that courts are not
authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even though the parties may allege
that the award rests on error of fact or on misrepresentation.""10
As to the complaint that the arbitrator inappropriately relied on his knowledge of
"grievances in the federal public setor," the dissent states that this merely explains
the chosen remedy."' The dissent quotes the Supreme Court's decision in
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. where the Court emphasized that
the arbitrator should use his informed judgment, especially when he determines a
remedy because there is a greater need for flexibility in determining a remedy." 2

V. COMMENT
The majority found that the arbitrator had overstepped the authority that the
parties gave him in their labor agreement." 3 The Fifth Circuit interpreted two
portions of the Agreement to collectively mean that the arbitrator was not allowed
to re-evaluate an aggrieved employee." 4 While the court's interpretation was
plausible, the court had to stretch far to vacate the award. To reverse the
arbitrator and the district court, the court had to find that its interpretation was not
only plausible, but that it was also the only "rational" interpretation of the
Agreement, and further, that the language was "clear and unequivocal.""' 5
Through these findings, the court made the difficult argument that the language
was so unambiguous that the arbitrator, the district court, and the dissenting judge
of this court must have been irrational to find as they did. While this argument
would seem so difficult that a court would rarely reverse an arbitrator, the Fifth
Circuit's finding is consistent with a disturbing trend to treat arbitrator's findings
with less deference.
In order to vacate the arbitrator's award, the Fifth Circuit had to find that the
language of the Agreement was "clear and unequivocal."" 6 The dissent,
however, reading the same clauses in the Agreement, found that the Agreement

108. Id. at 187.
109. Id. at 186-87.
110. Id.at 187 (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 36).
111. Id. at 187 r.3.
112. Id. "The draftsmen may never have thought of what specific remedy should be awarded to
meet a particular contingency." Id. (quoting Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597).
113. Id. at 184.
114. Id.

115. Id.
116. Id.
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expressly authorized the arbitrator to re-evaluate Thornal."17 The majority not
only interpreted the language to mean the exact opposite of the dissent's
interpretation, but also found that the language unambiguously prohibited the
arbitrator from re-evaluating Thomal. "l 8 In actuality, the linchpin here is not the
court's interpretation of the Agreement, but rather the finding that the language
is "clear and unequivocal."' 1 9
One commentator, Mark Berger, notes that collective bargaining agreements
are often designed to be ambiguous because of the necessities of the bargaining
relationship. 2
Labor agreements are not the normal arms-length contracts
between consensual parties designed to cover discrete events. 12' Rather, the
parties are required by law to negotiate an agreement that will govern their mutual
working environment for several years. 22 Because these forced negotiations
result in a general document, it is unlikely that there is one meaning for a contract
provision."' As a result, interpretation of the document may require more than
standard principles of contractual analysis; and it is the arbitrator's job to
determine which of these other principles to employ.'24 Thus, Berger submits
that determining "error" by an arbitrator in this setting is more subjective than
objective. 25 In other words, a district or appellate court is often not qualified
to determine whether an arbitrator misinterpreted an agreement. The Supreme
26
Court's narrow standard for reviewing arbitrators' awards reflects this reality.
The commentators have noted the trend towards less deference to
arbitrators. 2 7 According to Lynch, the public policy exception 28 has helped
persuade some courts to give closer scrutiny to an arbitrator's interpretations of
collective bargaining agreements.129 The public policy exception was part of the
reasoning behind the Fifth Circuit's decision in Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v.

117. Id. at 185.
118. Id. at 184.
119. Id.
120. Berger, supra note 21, at 257.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.at 257-58. See Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597 ("When an arbitrator is commissioned
to interpret and apply the collective bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear
inorder to reach a fair solution of a problem.").
125. Berger, supra note 21, at 258.
126. See supra note 82.
127. Dennis 0. Lynch, Deferral, Waiver, and Arbitration Under the NLRA: From Status to
ContractandBack Again, 44 U. MAM L, REV.237, 267-71 (1989); Craver, supra note 49, at 59599; Timothy J. Heinsz, JudicialReview of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Enterprise Wheel Goes
Around and Around, 52 Mo. L. REv. 243, 247 (1987).
128. The public policy exception allows a court to forgo the usual deference to arbitration where,
for instance, a court feels it would be against public policy to enforce an award reinstating a pilot who
had flown while intoxicated. Lynch, supra note 126, at 268.
129. Id at 269.
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District 2 Marine Eng 'rs BeneficialAss'n, where a riverboat pilot's competency
was in question.1 30 Of course, this trend is nothing new.
While courts may use the public policy exception, it may also use the
3
Enterprise Wheel standard to encroach on the purview of arbitrator discretion.1 1
Professor Heinsz correctly states the paradox of the standard set forth by the
Supreme Court in EnterpriseWheel: The "essence" of the contract is exactly what
is in dispute, therefore, a court can seize the language of the Supreme Court
standard to second-guess the arbitrator. 132 Examining the same language in an
agreement that the arbitrator examines, the reviewing court may still claim that the
arbitrator neither rationally applied the contract nor followed the essence of the
contract, but instead, applied "his own brand of industrial justice."' 33 In other
words, though the EnterpriseWheel standard encourages courts to leave arbitration
in the hands of experts, it also allows an overeager court to grab ambiguous
language in an agreement and state that the arbitrator violated that language. In
Houston Lighting & Power Co., the Fifth Circuit did seize the opportunity to
abuse the standard by overanalyzing the decision of the arbitrator and declaring
that the interpretation was irrational.
The instant decisionbuilds on the Fifth Circuit's erosion of confidence in the
arbitrator's ability to interpret a collective bargaining agreement.' 34 As Craver
correctly states, it was the court in Delta Queen who "dispens[ed its] own brand
of industrial justice" by essentially ignoring the contract when it re-interpreted the
contract. 3 ' Similarly, the Fifth Circuit not only imposed its view of the contract
on the parties, but in the process overturned the contracted-for interpretation of the
arbitrator. It seems that the court reversed the presumption in favor of arbitrator
discretion. Where a court should review a contract to see if the power exercised
by the arbitrator was specifically prohibited by the contract, this court seems to
have looked for specific language giving the arbitrator the power he exercised.

130. Craver, supra note 49, at 596.
131. Heinsz, supra note 126, at 247.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 249.
134. It even calls into question the ability of counsel to properly frame the issues for the arbitrator
and the reviewing court. Houston Lighting & Power, 71 F.3d at 184-85.
135. Craver, supra note 49, at 597.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The Fifth Circuit in Houston Lighting & Power follows a disturbing trend
among some courts to lessen the judicial deference to arbitrator interpretation of
labor contracts. This trend flies in the face of the Supreme Court policy against
judicial meddling in arbitration. More importantly, this trend will serve to
undermine the confidence of industry and the unions in the reliability of the
arbitration process.
MICHAEL G. MUNSELL
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